Chinese civilization produced a peculiar system of religious beliefs and practices, its basis being the idea of continuity, cooperation or “harmonic unity” of gods and people. The mundane and the spiritual world were closely tied, like one family, with mutually obligatory relations. The goal of religious cults was to provide well being (“happiness”) already in the earthly existence. This became the basis of Chinese religious syncretism which made different religions the metaphors of each other. The stability of this system was strengthened by a certain hierarchy of cults determined both by their form and their political status. This hierarchy did not exclude the confrontation between official and socalled “indecent” cults, which reflected the general typology of cultural forms. The coming of foreign religions — Buddhism, later Islam and Christianity — did not shatter the foundations of traditional syncretism and in many ways even reinforced them. The general tendency of Chinese religion’s evolution was secularization and interiorization of its ideals and values. This development finally led to sharp confrontation between new secularized religions and the state authority. In contemporary China, as in the past, religions are supposed to serve the state and the ruling Communist party as representations of the universal moral order.

The article examines the political aspects of Tibetan Buddhism built around the institution of the Dalai Lamas of Tibet. The author analyzes the traditional political concepts that existed in the Qing empire, such as: “the world of China and barbarians (huayi)”, “Buddhist master and secular patron (mchodyon)”, “unity of religion and politics (chos srid zung ‘brel)” and “our great Qing (manu yeke cing).” The author then ex‑ amines the status of the Dalai Lamas of Tibet in the context of their re‑ lationship with China. The political fragmentation of Tibet, connected with the natural background of the Tibetan plateau, prevented the cre‑ ation of a centralized secular state in Tibet, and only an external force such as the Khoshut Mongols or Manchus could change the balance of power in favor of the Gelukpa religious school, headed by the Dalai La‑ mas. The creation of the concept of “unity of religion and politics” by the Fifth Dalai Lama in the 17th century and the existence of the de facto independent Tibetan state under the leadership of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in the early 20th century contributed to the formation of Tibetan nationalism centered around the institution of Dalai Lamas.

The article deals with the spatial development of Catholicism in China in the period before and after the country’s independence and up to the present time. The authors focus upon the administrative and territorial structure of the Catholic Church within mainland China, as well as Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong. Based on the analysis of statistical sources, documents of the Holy See and the Government of China, bilateral treaties and media sources, we reveal a high degree of inertia of the spatial presence of Catholicism and its structure. There are five core regions in terms of numbers and density of the Catholic population and the concentration of religious objects; and the periphery, where the Catholic presence is much weaker. The authors conclude that the main problem facing the Catholic Church in China today is to gain the unity of its Chinese and Vatican “branches”, which can be achieved only through reconciliation between the Holy See and the Chinese government. Vatican diplomacy showed its centuries old experience in resolving such disputes and reached, in 2018, a typically “medieval” compromise with the communist leadership, based upon the “double loyalty” of Chinese Catholics to their country and the Holy See. However, the question remains to what extent this agreement will be able to ensure the dynamic growth and further rooting of Catholicism in China in the 21st century.

The article highlights the history of the Russian ecclesiastical mission and other church institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church in China since the 17th century; the formation, current state, problems and prospects of the Chinese Orthodox Church, which received independence from the Moscow Patriarchate in 1956; the influence of Chinese Orthodoxy on humanitarian ties between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The article considers the development of the Church in the context of the official religious policy, the continuing political regulation of religions by the State institutions and the Communist party.

The article examines the influence of the religious policy of the People’s Republic of China on the development of the Buddhist Sangha of Mongolia. The author shows that this policy is based on models developed in times of the Qing Empire (1644–1912). There was a single religious space that connected Tibet, China and Mongolia. The key link connecting these Buddhist centers was the tulku institution — the characters of the Buddhist pantheon who were believed to be consciously incarnated. Tulkus were born in Tibet and Mongolia, approved by the Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama, while the Qing court tried to control the process. The laws and measures taken by Chinese government agencies actually establish Chinese control over the procedure for the search, approval, enthronement and training of the tulku. This policy directly affects Buddhism in Mongolia, where the institution of Khuvilgaans is being revived and there are close ties with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan diaspora. It was the Dalai Lama who approved most of the living Mongolian tulkus, including the highest — the Tenth Bogdo Gegeen. At the same time, some Mongolian Buddhists reject the Tibetan interference and cooperate with Chinese religious and state organizations. The growth of nationalist sentiments in Mongolia, along with China’s religious policy, may eventually lead to the disintegration of the Tibetancentered structure and the isolation of the Mongolian Sangha under the leadership of the Tenth Bogdo.

This article analyzes the characteristics and activities of the religious organization Chondogyo in the first half of the twentieth century, which ultimately led it to the cooperation with the communists. Particular attention is paid to the perception of the “revolution” within the framework of the Korean doctrine of Gaebyeok, which in many ways brought together two seemingly completely different ideologies. A study of archival materials showed that in the conditions of the non modern society and the absence of the sacred and profane dichotomy religion often becomes a basis for the formation of national identity. Besides, it also frequently served as a way of expressing desires for completely secular ideas of political and social transformations. This fact becomes especially noticeable with a shift of the religious focus from “another” world to this one, as well as with the advent of eschatological ideas that aquired, in contrast to the western analogues, some cyclical features.

This article aims to reveal the relationships of power in the canonical sacred texts of Caodaism, in order to explain the continuous influence of the cult since its foundation in the 1920s. Most researchers of Caodaism have focused so far on political and economic aspects of the movement, leaving aside the pragmatics of the teaching as it was formulated in its holy scriptures. The methodology of my research derives from the Foucault’s theory of power and Boyer’s theory of supernatural agency. I have applied Fairclough’s version of discourse analysis to study a few fragments from the Caodaist catechesis, church rules and theological compilations. The study shows that the power was built within the cult through a number of discourse strategies, such as spirit possession, which was traditionally influential in Vietnamese culture; a new writing system; as well as basic concepts of the religious syncretism, reinforced by grammatical identity markers that helped to create a church hierarchy. Cao Đài spiritual revelations have intertextually incorporated Taoist and Buddhist ideas, as well as Confucian ethics that Vietnamese were well familiar with, thus constructing pragmatic presupposition for church priests and followers, while interdiscursive character of scriptures represented innovations and an attempt of rebooting the traditional system of beliefs to save the nation from the upcoming imaginary catastrophe.

Religious policy in modern China is based on the principles of freedom of religion, separation of politics and religion, and reliance on law in governing religions. Under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Chinese government, a system of religious policy that reflects the pattern of socialism with Chinese characteristics has developed in the country. These policies made it possible to reach a firm agreement in the relations between religions and the socialist society. The present government is firmly committed to the Cinization of Chinese religions. The government uses the core values of socialism to lead and educate religious people to develop the best aspects of Chinese tradition.

This article focuses on the perception of Confucianism in modern China, its revival, and its prospects in the future. Confucianism has always been a major current in Chinese culture, but it lost all its prerogatives after the abolition of the system of academic examinations and the dismantling of the feudal system of imperial China. After 1949, it survived only in Taiwan and among the Chinese diaspora. New Confucianism in mainland China grew out of the debate over whether it was a religion or not. Its activity as a political doctrine reached its peak by 2015, but then it lost its prominence being considered irrelevant. Subsequently, individual scholars put forward different versions of Confucian ideology, including “civil religion”, “a new doctrine of humanity”, “an ontology of humanity”, “living Confucianism”, and so on. At the same time, the Party and the government supported Confucianism as an influential cultural force. In 2008, traditional holidays were made nonworking days, and in 2012 the CPC Congress put forward a Confucianbased ideal of the “common destiny of mankind.” In this context, the continent’s followers of New Confucianism have sought to renounce metaphysics and emphasize its inclusiveness, intellectual freedom, and practicality, greatly expanding the scope of the Confucian world and creating a space for ConfucianChristian dialogue. In the future, Confucianism will become even more inclusive and uninhibited, and its propaganda activities will increase.

For a millennium and a half, Buddhism has been a traditional component of Chinese culture, a pillar of Chinese spirituality. It also plays an important role in the modern restructuring of Chinese culture. The fate of Buddhism over the past hundred years has reflected the dramatic twists and turns of China’s historical path. The Buddhist community and the educated upper classes have made active use of the resources of Buddhist thought, seeking to make Buddhism an important part of both social order and personal spiritual life. The most fruitful and influential facet of these reflections was the concept of “Human Buddhism” created by the great Buddhist scholar Taisiu. This concept gained recognition both in China and abroad. It opened up new paths for the development of Buddhist thought and practice. The activities of Taisui’s followers have gained prominence and influence in mainland China, Taiwan, and among the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia.

The article analyzes a series of manuscript texts on occult sciences in Islam which had been in circulation among the Muslims of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Despite the harsh critique on behalf of Muslim scholars and archival marginalization of related sources, the magical texts, figures, and practices associated with them were perceived as an integral part of Russia’s Islamic culture with a system of knowledge transmission. A multilingual environment of magical texts covered a wide range of genres and disciplines, including the works on astrology, medicine, and various forms of geomancy. The manuscripts dated between the late sixteenth and the twentieth centuries help us demonstrate the perspectives of the occult turn in Russian Islamic studies — a careful study of the history of occult sciences in Russian Islam. This is especially true in regard of the material aspects of the used ingredients, talismans, and communications with people or natural objects. Attention to occult practices allows to grasp better the Weltanschauung of Russia’s Muslims, the peculiarities of the creative engagement with the respective AraboPersian and Ottoman traditions.

The article attempts to identify the intellectual influence on the historical research of Sergey Ivanovich Smirnov, one of the most famous Church historians of prerevolutionary Russia, who studied the phenomenon of dukhovniks (spiritual fathers). First, we will show the reception of the concept of charisma in Russia in the context of the ideas of K. Holl who studied the power “to knit and solve” in Greekspeaking monasticism. Hall’s thesis that charisma was the source of power of Byzantine monks is clearly associated with the main trends in Protestant theology of his time. The article briefly outlines the German context, from which prof. Smirnov borrowed the idea of “charismatism”, and demonstrates how the term becomes incorporated in the Russian theological vocabulary. The influence of Holl on Smirnov is considered in the analysis of the first edition of the «The Spiritual Father in Old Russia», and then in the second edition, fifteen years later, after Smirnov has significantly revised his ideas. The result of this research was the work of 1906, in which Hall’s ideas are structurally and conceptually used, and the concept of «charisma» is included in the text. The conclusion suggests that Smirnov’s categorical framework, through the reception of the concept of «charisma», was a conscious construction of the new model of the priest and reflected his ecclesiastical and political agenda of reforms in the Church.

This article examines the daily life of one Catholic traditionalist community in St. Petersburg, the followers of the Society of St. Pius X. As the Catholic Church has undergone a revision of traditional Catholic aesthetics since the Second Vatican Council (primarily in the liturgical context), traditionalists have sought to restore an orthodox vision of aesthetics. This goal is realized in the autonomous organization of the Tridentine Mass and the reflections on the decline of liturgical piety. The traditionalists’ search for connections between orthodoxy and the realm of beauty also extends to the areas of everyday life, where they meticulously construct an aesthetically verified traditional image. This scrupulousness often gives grounds for observers to compare traditionalism with a play, which is reflected by the Society’s followers in the ironic modality. Drawing on the work of anthropologists Simon Coleman, John Elsner, and Tanya Luhrmann, the author shows the epistemological entanglements between seriousness and irony, orthodoxy and creativity in the contemporary Catholic Traditionalist movement.