The paper observes key results of the studies of the relationship be‑ tween religion and fertility in Europe and North America during the last five decades, when this problem attracted serious interest from demographers. Three central hypotheses about this relationship are discussed: the “characteristics hypothesis,” the “norms hypothesis” and the “minorities hypothesis.” Empirical data which initially sup‑ ported each of these hypotheses are presented. The paper then gives a brief overview of fertility trends in Europe and North America in the second half of the twentieth — the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. It is shown that the focus of studies of fertilitytoreligion relation changed considerably in the process of the “second demographic transition”, a complex transformation of values and family patterns in economically developed countries in the last third of the twentieth century. The focus of research shifted accordingly from fertility differences between religions/denominations to the role of personal religiosity as a variable. Then we overview the results of quantitative studies focused on the role of personal religiosity as a factor in both actual fertility and fertility intentions.

The paper considers the impact of religion on birth rates among Muslim communities of today’s world. The first section contains a brief overview of fertility trends in countries where Muslims constituted the majority by the early twenty-first century. It is shown that, despite a significant de‑ crease of fertility in those countries, in most of them it has not reached the low levels observed in Europe and North America. Then an overview of studies on fertility among Muslims is offered. These studies mainly consider three hypotheses about the impact of religion upon fertility: the “characteristics hypothesis,” the “norms hypothesis” and the “minorities hypothesis.” Most of these studies show that Islamic norms by themselves are not a factor of higher fertility. Nevertheless, birth rate can be higher in communities where some form of religious ideology plays an important role. At the same time, higher fertility of Muslims is often explained by “traditionalism” in family organization. However, this factor of “family traditionalism” is also valid for other religions. The second section of the paper is a casestudy of a Russian region with a Muslim majority, the Republic of Karachay-Cherkesia. The analysis of a survey conducted in 2018 shows that higher fertility is associated with some parameters of personal religiosity of women. The survey results are compared with other studies of Muslims in different parts of the world.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the share of believers, as well as practicing believers among young Russians increased. All four so called traditional religions in Russia — Christian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism — encourage large families. Although the data from official statistics does not allow finding a correlation between fertility and religion, this can be done with the data of socio demographic surveys. We use the Russian part of “Generations and Gender Survey” (conducted in 2004) and “Person, Family, Society” (conducted in 2017) to analyze the differences in the number of children ever born among women in the generations 1930–1989 depending on their religion and religious activity. Our results show that the fertility of Muslim women from 19401979 birth cohorts is close to or above the level of reproduction. Total fertility rate of Orthodox and non believers is stable at about 1.7 children per woman. Women from the 1930–1939 birth cohorts demonstrate the variability of reproductive behavior depending on personal religiosity. However, women from 1940–1969 birth cohorts follow the same twochild ideal scenario. The survival analysis revealed that we could expect the spread of childlessness both among Orthodox Christians and especially among nonbelievers. Our results also demonstrate a weak effect of personal high religiosity on the chances of women from the 1980–1989 birth cohorts becoming mothers for three or more children.

The results of the study of the influence of religiosity on the reproductive behavior of Russians, presented in the article, are based on two sociological surveys: “Selective observation of the reproductive plans of the population” conducted by Rosstat in 2012 (10 thousand people in 30 regions of Russia) and “Demographic well being of the regions of Russia,” held in October 2019 — March 2020 in 10 regions (5.6 thousand people). The weight in both surveys is assessed on the basis of answers to the question of how of‑ ten a person reads prayers (appeals to God with prayers). Authors also use answers to the question about what religion a person be‑ longs to. A preliminary analysis showed that the answers to the question of whether a person considers him or herself believer are not informative. The article analyzes religionrelated differences in reproductive orientations — the desired and expected number of children; the prevalence of orientations for a large number of children; the motives for the birth of third children; and the importance of children in comparison with other life values. The link between reproductive intentions and religiosity was confirmed in defining a preferred number of children. An analysis of the perception of living conditions in terms of their impact on reproductive behavior depending on religiosity showed that both believers and nonbelievers are equally aware of the importance of the socioeconomic conditions of family life for the realization of reproductive intentions.

The article begins with an examination of the theoretical relationship be‑ tween religion and fertility in the frame of modernization. The development of concepts of reproductive behavior is presented in line with general social theories. Religiosity in the modern world, on the one hand, acts as one of the factors of reproductive behavior, and, on the other hand, affects social behavior in a broader sense, affecting the life choices in a variety of available alternatives. The author develops a methodo ogy of analyzing the relationship between fertility and religion in a situation when the concept of religiosity becomes very vague. The empirical part of the work is based on a series of indepth interviews with lay followers of the Russian Orthodox Old Believer Church, as well as expert interviews with clergymen of this denomination. The Old Believers’ ethos combines elements of modernity (they are residents of large cities with the respective lifestyle) and the traditional attitudes in compliance with religious prescriptions. The author correlates the vision of the Old Believers of their life path with its modern scenarios. The question is to what extent informants preserve and implement the prescribed norm of having several children, what is the role of religion and community in this attitude. It shows how the Old Believers solve a typically modern puzzle of finding a balance between parenthood and other life roles. The article explores the transformation of the traditional family norms among the laity and clergy under the influence of external normative ideas.

The article is about the impact of Islamic fundamentalist views on fam‑ ily relations. The main research question is whether Islamic fundamentalism contributes to a preservation of traditional family relations or it rather leads to their modernisation. The analysis is based on two types of sources: the results of the longterm fieldwork in the North Caucasian Islamic fundamentalist milieu; and the data collected within internet surveys of Muslims — Dagestani, Ingushes and Chechens. The research demonstrated that in spite of the common religious stock, various groups of Islamic fundamentalists understand the norms of family life quite differently. The presumed “fundamentalist family” can be based on totally archaic principles, implementing strict generational and gender hierarchies and practicing family violence. However, it can also represent a conservative model of a modern family characterized by a certain gender inequality and a separation of gender functions; yet, female family members can be educated and are allowed to work, and the marriage is based on emotional bonds. Various mixes of archaic and modern elements are possible. It should be also noted that religion is not the only source of the norms in family life: ethnic traditions, social environment as well as influence of parental families also play their roles.

In the social sciences, the quantitative surveys of the correlation between religion and fertility refer to a rather vague interpretation of certain social norms and fail to analyze their real meaning. This article uses a different strategy. We analyze the above correlation on the basis of long interviews with the members of priests’ families. Based on the methodology of “grounded theory”, the categories of awareness of childbearing and the logic of justification for obstacles to childbirth are highlighted. To demonstrate the logic be‑ hind the correlation, three different cases are considered showing how priests and their wives present various types of narratives to expose their positions regarding procreation. The first type is designated as “opentrusting”, the second — “intermediate”, the third — “planningrational”. In the first case, religiosity, described through the category of “trust in God,” directly correlates with a person’s attitude to the birth of children: a person who uses contraception “trusts God” less, and his connection with God weakens. In the second case, the contraception is seen as permissible but is characterized as “lack of faith” . In the third case, respondents spoke about the influence of religion on everyday life using the categories “high degree of support” and “happiness”, which are associated with an open attitude to childbirth. They also talk about the use of contraception as an action related to the sphere of individual choice. With the help of the categories such as “maturity”, “reasonableness”, “responsibility”, etc., the respondents describe the situation of their family life associated with housing conditions, difficulties of raising their first child, etc. The article then offers a further nuanced discussion of the above correlation.

While infertility spurs the growth of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), religiously motivated evaluation of reproductive donation and thirdparty parenthood affect the users of ART individually and the ART industry nationally. The article surveyed extant research on the ways religious beliefs of various actors such as governments and legislatures, medical institutions, donors and recipients, influence their attitudes towards reproductive donation. Three countries with dominant confessions and, more importantly, the confessions, which have strong articulate views on reproductive donation, were selected: Israel, Turkey, and Poland. While all these nations favor pronatalist attitudes, they have their own interpretations of how pronatalist goals should be achieved. Judaism and Israeli society demonstrate positive evaluation of reproduction and multiplication of the people, therefore, they offer robust collective support for reproductive technologies and donation. In Turkey, the influence of Islam on legal and ethical evaluation of reproduction is subtle but strong. It limits the treatment of infertility to officially married couples. Polish Roman Catholics are active in the political lobbying of restrictions on ART and in public condemnation of liberalizing reproductive rights.

The article compares views on surrogate motherhood in the Muslim communities of the Middle East and Russia. It identifies current trends in attitudes of the Muslim population and Muslim leaders to surrogacy. Although Sunni Muslim leaders in the Middle East remain predominantly opposed to it, and public opinion in general continues to view surrogacy as an unacceptable form of assisted reproductive technology, some researchers advocate a change in attitude. Shiite Is‑ lam allows gestational surrogacy as a method of overcoming infertility and promotes the respective technologies, and this policy is sup‑ ported by the Shi’a population. In Russia, despite the predominance of Sunni Islam among the Muslim population, the negative attitude to‑ wards surrogate motherhood is not as categorical as in the countries of the Middle East. Spiritual leaders allow the use of surrogacy in exceptional cases, when this is the only way to have children. The differences in restrictions in the use of reproductive technologies contribute to the development of “tourism” in the field of reproductive health.

The article examines images of “headless beasts” from the Cave of Beasts (Wadi Sura II) in the rocks of Gilf Kebir, Sahara. Based on a comparison of more than 30 almost identical paintings of “beasts”, it is concluded that the central white figure cannot be considered an anthropomorphic prototype of the ancient Egyptian goddess Nut, as the Czech Egyptologist Miroslav Bárta unambiguously asserts. Nevertheless, the mythritual complex he had spied on actually reveals an inner connection and a number of similarities with the religion of ancient Egypt. According to Vladimir Propp’s observations about initiation rites and egyptological data, parallels are drawn with the later Egyptian tradition. These parallels, however, are found not so much in imagery as in the field of similar cultural and religious principles.

The article offers an analysis of the churchpolitical views of the Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna Philaret (Drozdov). For almost sixty years, during the reign of the three emperors, St. Philaret was regarded as a leading church figure. The authors consider a number of stories in the history of churchstate relations during the reign of Alexander I, Nicholas I and Alexander II, in which Metropolitan Philaret was actively involved, and analyze his position. It turns out that Philaret’s views often contradicted the prevailing political ideas. Defending the need to translate the Bible into Russian under Alexander I, falling under the scrutiny of the Third Department under Nicholas I, he, however, advocated corporal punishment and opposed liberalism in the era of “Great Reforms”. Considering that the Church should determine the course of social and political life, he did not agree with the proposal to include the episcopate in the Council of State. Nevertheless, Philaret always remained an authoritative theologian and he was within the inner circle of those who determined church policy.

The idea of deification (theosis) is one of the most relevant topics for the Orthodox theology today, and not only in Russia: “The Oxford Handbook of Deification” is forthcoming in 2023. However, there are numerous gaps in the history of Russian theology, which, for various reasons, have not drawn the attention of researchers. One of those gaps is related to the name of an outstanding early twentieth century Russian patrologist, Ivan Vasilievich Popov. He was the first in Russian theology to provide a conceptualization of this topic. While returning to this topic a few times in different contexts, Popov did not repeat himself but made substantial changes to his conception. In particular, in his last work he formulated the thesis on two forms of deification in the ancient Church: “realistic” and “idealistic”. Of much interest is also the context of his work, which is associated with the names of Popov’s elder contemporaries — Adolf von Harnack and Vladimir Solovyov. Without identifying himself entirely with other approaches, Popov ultimately tried to integrate the conception of deification into his own views on the ideal of Christian life.

The article shows the history of the practice of Christian conciliation in the United States in the second half of the 20th and early 21st centuries as a result of a combination of several factors, primarily the activities of Protestant churches and Christian lawyers, the spread of the system of alternative dispute resolution and the peculiarities of the First Amendment interpretation by the courts. The author analyzes in detail the structure and main directions of activities of the leading organizations such as the Institute for Christian Conciliation and “RW360”. Particular attention is paid to the procedure of religious conciliation, mediation and arbitration, as well as educational activities for the training of Christian peacekeepers and their certification. There are both sup‑ porters and opponents of Christian conciliation practices in the United States. The former consider this mechanism as part of freedom of religion and a tool for improving social relations, reducing conflict in society, while the latter insist on the need to prohibit or limit such practices as violating human rights. According to the author, the system of Christian conciliation, despite its merits, is vulnerable to the penetration of unscrupulous practices from the legal sphere: mediators and arbitrators can treat ordinary believers unfairly in order to please the interests of religious organizations. Overall, the studied institutions are an example of how religious associations, using the opportunities provided by the secular legal system, expand their influence in society and actualize the traditional religious functions of disputes resolution.